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Decoy states have been proven to be a very useful method for significantly enhancing the perfor-
mance of quantum key distribution systems with practical light sources. While active modulation of
the intensity of the laser pulses is an effective way of preparing decoy states in principle, in practice
passive preparation might be desirable in some scenarios. Typical passive schemes involve paramet-
ric down-conversion. More recently, it has been shown that phase randomized weak coherent pulses
(WCP) can also be used for the same purpose [M. Curty et al., Opt. Lett. 34, 3238 (2009).] This
proposal requires only linear optics together with a simple threshold photon detector, which shows
the practical feasibility of the method. Most importantly, the resulting secret key rate is comparable
to the one delivered by an active decoy state setup with an infinite number of decoy settings. In this
paper we extend these results, now showing specifically the analysis for other practical scenarios
with different light sources and photo-detectors. In particular, we consider sources emitting ther-
mal states, phase randomized WCP, and strong coherent light in combination with several types of
photo-detectors, like, for instance, threshold photon detectors, photon number resolving detectors,
and classical photo-detectors. Our analysis includes as well the effect that detection inefficiencies
and noise in the form of dark counts shown by current threshold detectors might have on the final
secret ket rate. Moreover, we provide estimations on the effects that statistical fluctuations due to
a finite data size can have in practical implementations.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the first quan-
tum information task that reaches the commercial mar-
ket to offer efficient and user-friendly cryptographic sys-
tems providing an unprecedented level of security [1]. It
allows two distant parties (typically called Alice and Bob)
to establish a secure secret key despite the computational
and technological power of an eavesdropper (Eve), who
interferes with the signals [2]. This secret key is the es-
sential ingredient of the one-time-pad or Vernam cipher
[3], the only known encryption method that can deliver
information-theoretic secure communications.
Practical implementations of QKD are usually based
on the transmission of phase randomized weak coherent
pulses (WCP) with typical average photon number of 0.1
or higher [4]. These states can be easily prepared using
only standard semiconductor lasers and calibrated atten-
uators. The main drawback of these systems, however,
arises from the fact that some signals may contain more
than one photon prepared in the same quantum state.
When this effect is combined with the considerable at-
tenuation introduced by the quantum channel (about 0.2
dB/km), it opens an important security loophole. Eve
can perform, for instance, the so-called Photon Number
Splitting attack on the multi-photon pulses [5]. This at-
tack provides her with full information about the part of
the key generated with the multi-photon signals, without
causing any disturbance in the signal polarization. As a
result, it turns out that the standard BB84 protocol [6]
with phase randomized WCP can deliver a key gener-
ation rate of order O(η2), where η denotes the trans-
mission efficiency of the quantum channel [7, 8]. This
poor performance contrasts with the one expected from
a QKD scheme using a single photon source, where the
key generation rate scales linearly with η.
A significant improvement of the achievable secret key
rate can be obtained if the original hardware is slightly
modified. For instance, one can use the so-called decoy
state method [9, 10, 11, 12], which can basically reach the
performance of single photon sources. The essential idea
behind decoy state QKD with phase randomized WCP is
quite simple: Alice varies, independently and randomly,
the mean photon number of each signal state she sends
to Bob by employing different intensity settings. This is
typically realized by means of a variable optical attenu-
ator (VOA) together with a random number generator.
Eve does not know a priori the mean photon number
of each signal state sent by Alice. This means that her
eavesdropping strategy can only depend on the actual
photon number of these signals, but not on the partic-
ular intensity setting used to generate them. From the
2measurement results corresponding to different intensity
settings, the legitimate users can obtain a better estima-
tion of the behavior of the quantum channel. This fact
translates into an enhancement of the resulting secret key
rate. The decoy state technique has been successfully im-
plemented in several recent experiments [13], which show
the practical feasibility of this method.
While active modulation of the intensity of the pulses
suffices to perform decoy state QKD in principle, in prac-
tice passive preparation might be desirable in some sce-
narios. For instance, in those experimental setups oper-
ating at high transmission rates. Passive schemes might
also be more resistant to side channel attacks than ac-
tive systems. For example, if the VOA which changes
the intensity of Alice’s pulses is not properly designed, it
may happen that some physical parameters of the pulses
emitted by the sender depend on the particular setting
selected. This fact could open a security loophole in the
active schemes.
Known passive schemes rely typically on the use of a
parametric down-conversion (PDC) source together with
a photon detector [14, 15, 16]. The main idea behind
these proposals comes from the photon number corre-
lations that exist between the two output modes of a
PDC source. By measuring the photon number distribu-
tion of one output mode it is possible to infer the pho-
ton number statistics of the other mode. In particular,
Ref. [14] considers the case where Alice measures one of
the output modes by means of a time multiplexed de-
tector (TMD) which provides photon number resolution
capabilities [17]; Ref. [15] analyzes the scenario where the
detector used by Alice is just a simple threshold detector,
while the authors of Ref. [16] generalize the ideas intro-
duced by Mauerer et al. in Ref. [14] to QKD setups using
triggered PDC sources. All these schemes nearly reach
the performance of a single photon source.
More recently, it has been shown that phase random-
ized WCP can also be used for the same purpose [18].
That is, one does not need a non-linear optics network
preparing entangled states. The crucial requirement of
a passive decoy state setup is to obtain correlations be-
tween the photon number statistics of different signals;
hence it is sufficient that these correlations are classi-
cal. The main contribution of Ref. [18] is rather simple:
When two phase randomized coherent states interfere at
a beam splitter (BS), the photon number statistics of
the outcome signals are classically correlated. This effect
contrasts with the one expected from the interference of
two pure coherent states with fixed phase relation at a
BS. In this last case, it is well known that the photon
number statistics of the outcome signals is just the prod-
uct of two Poissonian distributions. Now the idea is sim-
ilar to that of Refs. [14, 15, 16]: By measuring one of the
two outcome signals of the BS, the conditional photon
number distribution of the other signal varies depending
on the result obtained [18]. In the asymptotic limit of an
infinite long experiment, it turns out that the secret key
rate provided by such a passive scheme is similar to the
one delivered by an active decoy state setup with infinite
decoy settings [18]. A similar result can also be obtained
when Alice uses heralded single-photon sources showing
non-Poissonian photon number statistics [19].
In this paper we extend the results presented in
Ref. [18], now showing specifically the analysis for other
practical scenarios with different light sources and photo-
detectors. In particular, we consider sources emitting
thermal states and phase randomized WCP in combina-
tion with threshold detectors and photon number resolv-
ing (PNR) detectors. In the case of threshold detectors,
we include as well the effect that detection inefficiencies
and dark counts present in current measurement devices
might have on the final secret ket rate. For simplicity,
these measurement imperfections were not considered in
Ref. [18]. On the other hand, PNR detectors allows us
to obtain ultimate lower bounds on the maximal per-
formance that can be expected at all from this kind of
passive setups. We also present a passive scheme that
employs strong coherent light and does not require the
use of single photon detectors, but it can operate with
a simpler classical photo-detector. This fact makes this
setup specially interesting from an experimental point of
view. Finally, we provide an estimation on the effects
that statistical fluctuations due to a finite data size can
have in practical implementations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we review
very briefly the concept of decoy state QKD. Next, in
Sec. III we present a simple model to characterize the
behavior of a typical quantum channel. This model will
be relevant later on, when we evaluate the performance
of the different passive schemes that we present in the fol-
lowing sections. Our starting point is the basic passive
decoy state setup introduced in Ref. [18]. This scheme
is explained very briefly in Sec. IV. Then, in Sec. V
we analyze its security when Alice uses a source of ther-
mal light. Sec. VI and Sec. VII consider the case where
Alice employs a source of coherent light. First, Sec. VI
investigates the scenario where the states prepared by Al-
ice are phase randomized WCP. Then, Sec. VII presents
a passive decoy state scheme that uses strong coherent
light. In Sec. VIII we discuss the effects of statistical
fluctuations. Finally, Sec. IX concludes the paper with a
summary.
II. DECOY STATE QKD
In decoy state QKD Alice prepares mixtures of Fock
states with different photon number statistics and sends
these states to Bob [9, 10, 11, 12]. The photon number
distribution of each signal state is chosen, independently
and at random, from a set of possible predetermined set-
tings. Let pln denote the conditional probability that a
signal state prepared by Alice contains n photons given
that she selected setting l, with l ∈ {0, . . . ,m}. For in-
stance, if Alice employs a source of phase randomized
WCP then pln = e
−µlµnl /n!, and she varies the mean
3photon number (intensity) µl of each signal. Assuming
that Alice has choosen setting l, such states can be de-
scribed as
ρl =
∞∑
n=0
pln|n〉〈n|, (1)
where |n〉 denote Fock states with n photons.
The gain Ql corresponding to setting l, i.e., the proba-
bility that Bob obtains a click in his measurement appa-
ratus when Alice sends him a signal state prepared with
setting l, can be written as
Ql =
∞∑
n=0
plnYn, (2)
where Yn denotes the yield of an n-photon signal, i.e.,
the conditional probability of a detection event on Bob’s
side given that Alice transmitted an n-photon state. Sim-
ilarly, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) associated to
setting l, that we shall denote as El, is given by
QlEl =
∞∑
n=0
plnYnen, (3)
with en representing the error rate of an n-photon signal.
Now the main idea of decoy state QKD is very simple.
From the observed data Ql and El, together with the
knowledge of the photon number distributions pln, Alice
and Bob can estimate the value of the unknown parame-
ters Yn and en just by solving the set of linear equations
given by Eqs. (2)-(3). For instance, in the general sce-
nario where Alice employs an infinite number of possible
decoy settings then she can estimate any finite number
of parameters Yn and en with arbitrary precision. On
the other hand, if Alice and Bob are only interested in
the value of a few probabilities (typically Y0, Y1, and
e1), then they can estimate them by means of only a few
different decoy settings [10, 11, 12].
In this paper we shall consider that Alice and Bob
treat each decoy setting separately, and they distill se-
cret key from all of them. We use the security analysis
presented in Ref. [10], which combines the results pro-
vided by Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) in
Ref. [8] (see also Ref. [20]) with the decoy state method.
Specifically, the secret key rate formula can be written as
R ≥
m∑
l=0
max{Rl, 0}, (4)
where Rl satisfies
Rl ≥ q{−Qlf(El)H(El) + pl1Y1[1−H(e1)] + pl0Y0}. (5)
The parameter q is the efficiency of the protocol (q =
1/2 for the standard BB84 protocol [6], and q ≈ 1
for its efficient version [21]); f(El) is the efficiency of
the error correction protocol as a function of the error
rate El [22], typically f(El) ≥ 1 with Shannon limit
f(El) = 1; e1 denotes the single photon error rate;
H(x) = −x log2 (x) − (1 − x) log2 (1− x) is the binary
Shannon entropy function.
To apply the secret key rate formula given by Eq. (5)
one needs to solve Eqs. (2)-(3) in order to estimate the
quantities Y0, Y1, and e1. For that, we shall use the pro-
cedure proposed in Ref. [12]. This method requires that
the probabilities pln satisfy certain conditions. It is im-
portant to emphasize, however, that the estimation tech-
nique presented in Ref. [12] only constitutes a possible
example of a finite setting estimation procedure and no
optimality statement is given. In principle, many other
estimation methods are also available for this purpose,
like, for instance, linear programming tools [23], which
might result in a sharper, or for the purpose of QKD
better, bounds on the considered probabilities.
III. CHANNEL MODEL
In this section we present a simple model to describe
the behavior of a typical quantum channel. This model
will be relevant later on, when we evaluate the perfor-
mance of the passive decoy state setups that we present
in the following sections. In particular, we shall consider
the channel model used in Refs. [10, 12]. This model re-
produces a normal behavior of a quantum channel, i.e.,
in the absence of eavesdropping. Note, however, that
the results presented in this paper can also be applied to
any other quantum channel, as they only depend on the
observed gains Ql and error rates El.
A. Yield
There are two main factors that contribute to the
yield of an n-photon signal: The background rate Y0,
and the signal states sent by Alice. Usually Y0 is, to a
good approximation, independent of the signal detection.
This parameter depends mainly on the dark count rate
of Bob’s detection apparatus, together with other back-
ground contributions like, for instance, stray light coming
from timing pulses which are not completely filtered out
in reception. In the scenario considered, the yields Yn
can be expressed as [10, 12]
Yn = 1− (1− Y0)(1 − ηsys)n, (6)
where ηsys represents the overall transmittance of the sys-
tem. This quantity can be written as
ηsys = ηchannelηBob, (7)
where ηchannel is the transmittance of the quantum chan-
nel, and ηBob denotes the overall transmittance of Bob’s
detection apparatus. That is, ηBob includes the trans-
mittance of any optical component within Bob’s mea-
surement device and the detector efficiency. The param-
eter ηchannel can be related with a transmission distance
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FIG. 1: Basic setup of a passive decoy state QKD scheme:
Interference of two Fock diagonal states, ρ and σ, at a beam
splitter (BS) of transmittance t; a and b represent the two
output modes.
d measured in km for the given QKD scheme as
ηchannel = 10
−αd
10 , (8)
where α represents the loss coefficient of the channel (e.g.,
an optical fiber) measured in dB/km.
B. Quantum bit error rate
The n-photon error rate en is given by [10, 12]
en =
Y0e0 + (Yn − Y0)ed
Yn
, (9)
where ed is the probability that a signal hits the wrong
detector on Bob’s side due to the misalignment in the
quantum channel and in his detection setup. For sim-
plicity, here we assume that ed is a constant independent
of the distance. Moreover, from now on we shall consider
that the background is random, i.e., e0 = 1/2.
IV. PASSIVE DECOY STATE QKD SETUP
The basic setup is rather simple [18]. It is illustrated
in Fig. 1. Suppose two Fock diagonal states
ρ =
∞∑
n=0
pn|n〉〈n|,
σ =
∞∑
n=0
rn|n〉〈n|, (10)
interfere at a BS of transmittance t. If the probabilities
pn and rn are properly selected, then it turns out that the
photon number distributions of the two outcome signals
can be classically correlated. By measuring the signal
state in mode b, therefore, the conditional photon number
statistics of the signal state in mode a vary depending on
the result obtained.
In the following sections we analyze the setup repre-
sented in Fig. 1 for different light sources and photo-
detectors. We start by considering a simple source of
thermal states. Afterwards, we investigate more practi-
cal sources of coherent light.
V. THERMAL LIGHT
Suppose that the signal state ρ which appears in Fig. 1
is a thermal state of mean photon number µ. Such state
can be written as
ρ =
1
1 + µ
∞∑
n=0
( µ
1 + µ
)n
|n〉〈n|, (11)
and let σ be a vacuum state. In this scenario, the joint
probability of having n photons in output mode a and m
photons in output mode b (see Fig. 1) has the form
pn,m =
1
1 + µ
(
n+m
m
)( µ
1 + µ
)n+m
tn(1 − t)m. (12)
That is, depending on the result of Alice’s measurement
in mode b, the conditional photon number distribution
of the signals in mode a varies.
In particular, we have that whenever Alice ignores the
result of her measurement, the total probability of finding
n photons in mode a can be expressed as
ptn =
∞∑
m=0
pn,m =
1
1 + µt
( µt
1 + µt
)n
. (13)
Next, we consider the case where Alice uses a threshold
detector to measure mode b.
A. Threshold detector
Such a detector can be characterized by a positive op-
erator value measure (POVM) which contains two ele-
ments, Fvac and Fclick, given by [24]
Fvac = (1− ǫ)
∞∑
n=0
(1− ηd)n|n〉〈n|,
Fclick = 1 − Fvac. (14)
The parameter ηd denotes the detection efficiency of the
detector, and ǫ represents its probability of having a dark
count. Eq. (14) assumes that ǫ is, to a good approxima-
tion, independent of the incoming signals. The outcome
of Fvac corresponds to “no click” in the detector, while
the operator Fclick gives precisely one detection “click”,
which means at least one photon is detected.
The joint probability for seeing n photons in mode a
and no click in the threshold detector, which we shall
denote as pc¯n, has the form
pc¯n = (1− ǫ)
∞∑
m=0
(1 − ηd)mpn,m = (1− ǫ)
r
(µt
r
)n
, (15)
with the parameter r given by
r = 1 + µ[t+ (1− t)ηd]. (16)
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FIG. 2: Conditional photon number distribution in mode a
(see Fig. 1): qc¯n (black) versus q
c
n (grey) when ρ is given by
Eq. (11), and σ is a vacuum state. We use µ = 1 and t = 1/2,
and we study two situations: (A) A perfect threshold photon
detector, i.e., ǫ = 0 and ηd = 1, and (B) ǫ = 3.2 × 10
−7
and ηd = 0.12. These last data correspond to the experiment
reported by Gobby et al. in Ref. [25].
If the detector produces a click, the joint probability of
finding n photons in mode a is given by
pcn = p
t
n − pc¯n. (17)
Figure 2 shows the conditional photon number statis-
tics of the outcome signal in mode a depending on the
result of the threshold detector (click and not click):
qcn = p
c
n/(1−Nth) and qc¯n = pc¯n/Nth, with
Nth =
∞∑
n=0
pc¯n =
1− ǫ
1 + µηd(1− t) . (18)
B. Lower bound on the secret key rate
We consider that Alice and Bob distill secret key both
from click and no click events. The calculations to esti-
mate the yields Y0 and Y1, together with the single pho-
ton error rate e1, are included in Appendix A.
For simulation purposes we use the channel model de-
scribed in Sec. III. After substituting Eqs. (6)-(9) into
the gain and QBER formulas we obtain that the param-
eters Qc¯, E c¯, Qt, and Et can be written as
Qc¯ = Nth − (1− ǫ)(1− Y0)
r − (1 − ηsys)µt ,
Qc¯E c¯ = (e0 − ed)Y0Nth + edQc¯,
Qt =
Y0 + µtηsys
1 + µtηsys
,
QtEt = (e0 − ed)Y0 + edQt, (19)
where Qc = Qt −Qc¯ and QcEc = QtEt −Qc¯E c¯.
The resulting lower bound on the secret key rate is
illustrated in Fig. 3 (dashed line). We employ the exper-
imental parameters reported by Gobby et al. in Ref. [25]:
Y0 = 1.7× 10−6, ed = 0.033, α = 0.21 dB/km, and Bob’s
detection efficiency ηBob = 0.045. We further assume
ε=3.2×10  , η =0.12
d
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FIG. 3: Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by
Eq. (4) in logarithmic scale for the passive decoy state setup
illustrated in Fig. 1 with two intensity settings. The signal
state ρ is given by Eq. (11), and σ is a vacuum state. We con-
sider two possible scenarios: (A) A perfect threshold detector,
i.e., ǫ = 0 and ηd = 1, and (B) ǫ = 3.2 × 10
−7 and ηd = 0.12
[25]. Both cases provide approximately the same final key
rate and they cannot be distinguished with the resolution of
this figure (dashed line). The solid line represents a lower
bound on R when Alice employs a PNR detector instead of a
threshold detector (see Appendix B 1).
that q = 1, and f(Ec) = f(E c¯) = 1.22. These data
are used as well for simulation purposes in the following
sections. We study two different scenarios: (A) A per-
fect threshold detector, i.e., ǫ = 0 and ηd = 1, and (B)
ǫ = 3.2 × 10−7 and ηd = 0.12 [25]. In both cases we
find that the values of the mean photon number µ and
the transmittance t which maximize the secret key rate
formula are quite similar and almost constant with the
distance. In particular, µ is quite strong (around 200
in the simulation), while t is quite weak (around 10−3).
This result is not surprising. When µ ≫ 1 and t ≪ 1,
Alice’s threshold detector produces a click most of the
times. Then, in the few occasions where Alice actually
does not see a click in her measurement device, she can
be quite confident that the signal state that goes to Bob
is quite weak. Note that in this scenario the conditional
photon number statistics qc¯n satisfy q
c¯
0 ≈ 1 and qc¯n≥1 ≈ 0.
Similarly to the one weak decoy state protocol proposed
in Ref. [12], this fact allows Alice and Bob to obtain an
accurate estimation of Y1 and e1, which results into an
enhancement of the achievable secret key rate and dis-
tance. The cutoff point where the secret key rate drops
down to zero is l ≈ 126 km.
One can improve the resulting secret key rate further
by using a passive scheme with more intensity settings.
For instance, Alice may employ a PNR detector instead
of a threshold detector, or she could use several thresh-
old detectors in combination with beam splitters. In this
context, see also Ref. [16]. Figure 3 illustrates also this
last scenario, for the case where Alice uses a PNR de-
tector (solid line). As expected, it turns out that now
the legitimate users can estimate the actual value of the
6relevant parameters Y0, Y1, and e1 with arbitrary pre-
cision (see Appendix B1). The cutoff point where the
secret key rate drops down to zero is l ≈ 147 km. This
result shows that the performance of the passive setup
represented in Fig. 1 with a threshold detector is already
close to the best performance that can be achieved at all
with such an scheme and the security analysis provided
in Refs. [8, 20].
VI. WEAK COHERENT LIGHT
Suppose now that the signal states ρ and σ which ap-
pear in Fig. 1 are two phase randomized WCP emitted
by a pulsed laser source. That is,
ρ = e−µ1
∞∑
n=0
µn1
n!
|n〉〈n|,
σ = e−µ2
∞∑
n=0
µn2
n!
|n〉〈n|, (20)
with µ1 and µ2 denoting, respectively, the mean photon
number of the two signals. In this scenario, the joint
probability of having n photons in output mode a and m
photons in output mode b can be written as [18]
pn,m =
υn+me−υ
n!m!
1
2π
∫ 2pi
0
γn(1 − γ)mdθ, (21)
where the parameters υ, γ, and ξ, are given by
υ = µ1 + µ2,
γ =
µ1t+ µ2(1− t) + ξ cos θ
υ
,
ξ = 2
√
µ1µ2(1− t)t. (22)
This result differs from the one expected from the in-
terference of two pure coherent states with fixed phase
relation, |√µ1eiφ1〉 and |√µ2eiφ2〉, at a BS of transmit-
tance t. In this last case, pn,m is just the product of two
Poissonian distributions. Whenever Alice ignores the re-
sult of her measurement in mode b, then the probability
of finding n photons in mode a can be expressed as
ptn =
∞∑
m=0
pn,m =
υn
n!
1
2π
∫ 2pi
0
γne−υγdθ, (23)
which turns out to be a non-Poissonian probability dis-
tribution [18]. Let us now consider the case where Alice
uses a threshold detector to measure output mode b.
A. Threshold detector
The analysis is completely analogous to the one pre-
sented in Sec. VA. In particular, the joint probability for
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FIG. 4: Conditional photon number distribution in mode a
(see Fig. 1): qcn (black) versus q
c¯
n (grey) when the signal states
ρ and σ are two phase randomized WCP given by Eq. (20).
We consider that µ1 = µ2 = 1 and t = 1/2, and we study
two situations: (A) A perfect threshold photon detector, i.e.,
ǫ = 0 and ηd = 1 [18], and (B) ǫ = 3.2× 10
−7 and ηd = 0.12.
These last data correspond to the experiment reported by
Gobby et al. in Ref. [25]. Cases C and D represent qcn (black)
versus a Poissonian distribution of the same mean photon
number for the two scenarios described above (perfect and
imperfect threshold photon detector).
seeing n photons in mode a and no click in the threshold
detector has now the form
pc¯n = (1− ǫ)
∞∑
m=0
(1 − ηd)mpn,m (24)
= (1− ǫ)υ
ne−ηdυ
n!
1
2π
∫ 2pi
0
γne−(1−ηd)υγdθ.
On the other hand, if the detector produces a click, the
joint probability of finding n photons in mode a is given
by Eq. (17). Figure 4 (Cases A and B) shows the con-
ditional photon number statistics of the outcome signal
in mode a depending on the result of the detector (click
and no click): qcn = p
c
n/(1−Nw) and qc¯n = pc¯n/Nw, with
Nw =
∞∑
n=0
pc¯n = (1− ǫ)e−ηd[µ1(1−t)+µ2t]I0,ηdξ, (25)
and where Iq,z represents the modified Bessel function of
the first kind [26]. This function is defined as [26]
Iq,z =
1
2πi
∮
e(z/2)(t+1/t)t−q−1dt. (26)
Figure 4 includes as well a comparison between qcn and a
Poissonian distribution of the same mean photon number
(Cases C and D). Both distributions, qcn and q
c¯
n, are also
non-Poissonian.
7B. Lower bound on the secret key rate
To apply the secret key rate formula given by Eq. (5),
with l ∈ {c, c¯}, we need to estimate the quantities Y0,
Y1, and e1. For that, we follow the same procedure ex-
plained in Appendix A. This method requires that ptn
and pc¯n satisfy certain conditions that we confirmed nu-
merically. As a result, it turns out that the bounds given
by Eqs. (A10)-(A16) are also valid in this scenario.
The only relevant statistics to evaluate Eqs. (A10)-
(A16) are ptn and p
c¯
n, with n = 0, 1, 2. These proba-
bilities can be obtained by solving Eqs. (23)-(24). They
are given in Appendix C. Note that pcn can be directly
calculated from these two statistics by means of Eq. (17).
After substituting Eqs. (6)-(9) into the gain and QBER
formulas we obtain
Qc¯ = Nw − (1− ǫ)(1 − Y0)e(ηd−ηsys)ω−ηdυ
× I0,(ηd−ηsys)ξ,
Qc¯E c¯ = (e0 − ed)Y0Nw + edQc¯,
Qt = 1− (1− Y0)e−ηsysωI0,ηsysξ,
QtEt = (e0 − ed)Y0 + edQt, (27)
with the parameter ω given by
ω = µ1t+ µ2(1− t). (28)
The resulting lower bound on the secret key rate is il-
lustrated in Fig. 5. We assume that t = 1/2, i.e., we
consider a simple 50 : 50 BS. Again, we study two dif-
ferent situations: (A) ǫ = 0 and ηd = 1 [18], and (B)
ǫ = 3.2 × 10−7 and ηd = 0.12 [25]. In both cases the
optimal values of the intensities µ1 and µ2 are almost
constant with the distance. One of them is quite weak
(around 10−4), while the other one is around 0.5. The
reason for this result can be understood as follows. When
the intensity of one of the signals is really weak, the out-
put photon number distributions in mode a are always
close to a Poissonian distribution (for click and no click
events). This distribution is narrower than the one aris-
ing when both µ1 and µ2 are of the same order of mag-
nitude. In this case, a better estimation of Y1 and e1
can be derived, and this fact translates into a higher se-
cret key rate. It must be emphasized, however, that from
an experimental point of view this solution might not be
optimal. Specially, since in this scenario the two output
distributions pcn and p
c¯
n might be too close to each other
for being distinguished in practice. This effect could be
specially relevant when one considers statistical fluctua-
tions due to finite data size (see Sec. VIII). For instance,
small fluctuations in a practical system could overwhelm
the tiny difference between the decoy state and the sig-
nal state in this case. Figure 5 includes as well the secret
key rate of an active asymptotic decoy state QKD system
with infinite decoy settings [10]. The cutoff points where
the secret key rate drops down to zero are l ≈ 128 km
(passive setup with two intensity settings) and l ≈ 147
km (active asymptotic setup). From these results we see
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FIG. 5: Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by Eq. (4)
in logarithmic scale for the passive decoy state setup illus-
trated in Fig. 1 with two intensity settings. The signal states
ρ and σ are two phase randomized WCP given by Eq. (20).
The transmittance of the BS is t = 1/2. We consider two
possible scenarios: (A) ǫ = 0 and ηd = 1 [18] (i.e., a per-
fect threshold photon detector), and (B) ǫ = 3.2 × 10−7 and
ηd = 0.12 [25]. Both cases provide approximately the same
final key rate and they cannot be distinguished with the res-
olution of this figure (dashed line). The solid line represents
a lower bound on R for an active asymptotic decoy state sys-
tem with infinite decoy settings [10]. This last result coincides
approximately with the case where Alice employs a PNR de-
tector (see Appendix B 2), and the secret key rate is both
scenarios cannot be distinguished with the resolution of this
figure.
that the performance of the passive scheme with a thresh-
old detector is comparable to the active one, thus showing
the practical interest of the passive setup.
Like in Sec. V, one can improve the performance of the
passive scheme further by using more intensity settings.
The case where Alice uses a PNR detector is analyzed in
Appendix B 2. The result is also shown in Fig. 5. It re-
produces approximately the behavior of the asymptotic
active setup and the secret key rate is both scenarios
cannot be distinguished with the resolution of this figure
(solid line). This result is not surprising, since in both
situations (passive and active) we apply Eq. (5) with the
actual values of the parameters Y0, Y1, and e1. The only
difference between these two setups arises from the pho-
ton number distribution of the signal states that go to
Bob. In particular, while in the passive scheme the rele-
vant statistics are given by Eq. (B9), in the active setup
these statistics have the form given by Eq. (B12).
C. Alternative implementation scheme
The passive setup illustrated in Fig. 1 requires that
Alice employs two independent sources of signal states.
This fact might become specially relevant when she uses
phase randomized WCP, since in this situation none of
the signal states entering the BS can be the vacuum state.
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FIG. 6: Alternative implementation scheme with only one
pulsed laser source. The delay introduced by one arm of the
interferometer is equal to the time difference between two
pulses. The intensity modulator (IM) blocks either all the
even or all the odd optical pulses in mode a.
Otherwise, the photon number distributions of the out-
put signals in mode a and mode b would be statistically
independent.
Alternatively to the passive scheme shown in Fig. 1,
Alice could as well employ, for instance, the scheme il-
lustrated in Fig. 6. This setup has only one laser diode,
but follows a similar spirit like the original scheme in
Fig. 1, where a photo-detector is used to measure the
output signals in mode b. It includes, however, an in-
tensity modulator (IM) to block either all the even or
all the odd pulses in mode a. This requires, therefore,
an active control of the functioning of the IM, but note
that no random number generator is needed here. The
main reason for blocking half of the pulses in mode a
is to suppress possible correlations between them. That
is, the action of the IM guarantees that the signal states
that go to Bob are tensor product of mixtures of Fock
states. Then, one can directly apply the security analy-
sis provided in Refs. [8, 10, 20]. Thanks to the one-pulse
delay introduced by one arm of the interferometer, to-
gether with a proper selection of the transmittance t1, it
can be shown that both setups in Fig. 1 and Fig. 6 are
completely equivalent, except from the resulting secret
key rate. More precisely, the secret key rate in the active
scheme is half the one of the passive setup, since half of
the pulses are now discarded.
VII. STRONG COHERENT LIGHT
Let us now consider the passive decoy state setup il-
lustrated in Fig. 7. This scheme presents two main dif-
ferences with respect to the passive system analyzed in
Sec. VI. In particular, the mean photon number (inten-
sity) of the signal states ρ and σ is now very high; for
instance, ≈ 108 photons. This fact allows Alice to use
a simple classical photo-detector to measure the pulses
in mode b, which makes this scheme specially suited for
experimental implementations. Moreover, it has an ad-
ditional BS of transmittance t2 to attenuate the signal
states in mode a and bring them to the QKD regimen.
Due to the high intensity of the input signal states ρ
and σ, we can describe the action of the first BS in Fig. 7
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t
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ρ
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1 2
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σ
FIG. 7: Basic setup of a passive decoy state QKD scheme
with strong coherent light. The mean photon number of the
signal states ρ and σ is now quite high; for instance, around
≈ 108 photons. t1 and t2 represent the transmittances of the
two BS, and a, b, and c denote output modes.
by means of a classical model. Specifically, let I1 (I2)
represent the intensity of the input states ρ (σ), and let
Ia(θ) [Ib(θ)] be the intensity of the output pulses in mode
a (b). Here the angle θ is just a function of the relative
phase between the two input states. It is given by
θ = φ1 − φ2 + π/2, (29)
where φ1 (φ2) denotes the phase of the signal ρ (σ).
Like in Sec. VI, we assume that these phases are uni-
formly distributed between 0 and 2π for each pair of in-
put states. This can be achieved, for instance, if Alice
uses two pulsed laser sources to prepare the signals ρ and
σ. With this notation, we have that Ia(θ) and Ib(θ) can
be expressed as
Ia(θ) = t1I1 + r1I2 + 2
√
t1r1I1I2 cos θ,
Ib(θ) = r1I1 + t1I2 − 2
√
t1r1I1I2 cos θ, (30)
where t1 denotes the transmittance of the BS, and r1 =
1− t1.
A. Classical threshold detector
For simplicity, we shall consider that Alice uses a per-
fect classical threshold detector to measure the pulses in
mode b. For each incoming signal, this device tells her
whether its intensity is below or above a certain thresh-
old value IM that satisfies Ib(π) > IM > Ib(0). That
is, the value of IM is between the minimal and maximal
possible values of the intensity of the pulses in mode b.
Note, however, that the analysis presented in this section
can be straightforwardly adapted to cover also the case
of an imperfect classical threshold detector, or a classical
photo-detector with several threshold settings. Figure 8
shows a graphical representation of Ib(θ) versus the angle
θ, together with the threshold value IM . The angle θth
which satisfies Ib(θth) = IM is given by
θth = arccos
(
r1I1 + t1I2 − IM
2
√
t1r1I1I2
)
. (31)
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FIG. 8: Graphical representation of the intensity Ib(θ) in
mode b (see Fig. 7) versus the angle θ. IM represents the
threshold value of the classical threshold detector, and θth is
its associated threshold angle.
Whenever the classical threshold detector provides Al-
ice with an intensity value below IM , it turns out that the
unnormalized signal states in mode c can be expressed as
ρ<IMout =
1
2π
∞∑
n=0
{∫ θth
0
e−Ia(θ)t2 [Ia(θ)t2]
n
n!
|n〉〈n|dθ
+
∫ 2pi
2pi−θth
e−Ia(θ)t2 [Ia(θ)t2]
n
n!
|n〉〈n|dθ
}
=
1
π
∞∑
n=0
∫ θth
0
e−Ia(θ)t2 [Ia(θ)t2]
n
n!
|n〉〈n|dθ. (32)
This means, in particular, that the joint probability of
finding n photons in mode c and an intensity value below
IM in mode b is given by
p<IMn =
tn2
n!π
∫ θth
0
Ia(θ)
ne−Ia(θ)t2dθ. (33)
Similarly, we find that p>IMn can be written as
p>IMn =
tn2
n!π
∫ pi
θth
Ia(θ)
ne−Ia(θ)t2dθ. (34)
Figure 9 (Case A) shows the conditional photon number
statistics of the outcome signal in mode c depending on
the result of the classical threshold detector (below or
above IM ): q
<IM
n = p
<IM
n /Ns and q
>IM
n = p
>IM
n /(1−Ns),
with
Ns =
∞∑
n=0
p<IMn =
θth
π
. (35)
This figure includes as well a comparison between q<IMn
(Case B) and q>IMn (Case C) and a Poissonian distribu-
tion of the same mean photon number. It turns out that
both distributions, q<IMn and q
>IM
n , approach a Poisso-
nian distribution when t2 is sufficiently small.
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FIG. 9: (A) Conditional photon number distribution in mode
c (see Fig. 7): q<IMn (black) and q
>IM
n (grey) for the case
I1 = I2 = IM = 10
8, t1 = 1/2, and t2 = 0.5 × 10
−8. Cases B
and C represent, respectively, q<IMn and q
>IM
n (black) versus
a Poissonian distribution of the same mean photon number
(grey).
B. Lower bound on the secret key rate
Again, to apply the secret key rate formula given by
Eq. (5), with l ∈ {< IM , > IM}, we need to estimate the
quantities Y0, Y1, and e1. Once more, we follow the pro-
cedure explained in Appendix A. We confirmed numer-
ically that the probabilities p<IMn and p
>IM
n satisfy the
conditions required to use this technique. As a result, it
turns out that the bounds given by Eqs. (A10)-(A16) are
also valid in this scenario.
For simplicity, we impose I1 = I2 = IM ≡ I. This
means that θth = π/2. The relevant statistics p
<IM
n and
p>IMn , with n = 0, 1, 2, are calculated in Appendix D.
After substituting Eqs. (6)-(9) into the gain and QBER
formulas we obtain
Q<IM = Ns − (1− Y0)e
−ηsysκ
2
(I0,ηsysζ − L0,ηsysζ),
Q<IME<IM = (e0 − ed)Y0Ns + edQ<IM ,
Q>IM = (1−Ns)− (1− Y0)e
−ηsysκ
2
× (I0,ηsysζ + L0,ηsysζ),
Q>IME>IM = (e0 − ed)Y0(1 −Ns) + edQ>IM , (36)
where the parameter κ is given by
κ = It2, (37)
and Lq,z represents the modified Struve function [27] de-
fined by Eq. (D2).
The resulting lower bound on the secret key rate is il-
lustrated in Fig. 10. We study two different situations:
(A) We impose t1 = 1/2, i.e., we consider a simple 50 : 50
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FIG. 10: Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by
Eq. (4) in logarithmic scale for the passive decoy state setup
illustrated in Fig. 7 with two intensity settings. We consider
two possible scenarios: (A) We impose t1 = 1/2, i.e., we
consider a simple 50 : 50 BS, and we optimize the parameter
κ (dashed line), and (B) we optimize both parameters, t1 and
κ (solid line).
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FIG. 11: Alternative implementation scheme with only one
pulsed laser source. The delay introduced by one arm of the
interferometer is equal to the time difference between two
pulses. The intensity modulator (IM) blocks either the even
or the odd optical pulses in mode c.
BS, and we optimize the parameter κ, and (B) we opti-
mize both quantities, t1 and κ. In both scenarios the op-
timal values of the parameters are almost constant with
the distance. In the first case κ is around 0.2, while in
the second case we obtain that t1 and κ are, respectively,
around 0.06 and 0.25. The cutoff point where the secret
key rate drops down to zero is l ≈ 132 km both in case
A and B. These results seem to indicate that this passive
scheme can offer a better performance than the passive
setups analyzed in Sec. V and in Sec. VI with a threshold
photon detector. This fact arises mainly from the prob-
ability distributions p<IMn and p
>IM
n , which, in this sce-
nario, approach a Poissonian distribution when t2 is suf-
ficiently small. Again, one can improve the performance
of this system even further just by using more threshold
settings in the classical threshold detector. Moreover,
from an experimental point of view, this configutation
might be more feasible than using PNR detectors.
To conclude this section, let us mention that, like in
Sec. VIC, Alice could as well employ, for instance, the al-
ternative active scheme illustrated in Fig. 11. This setup
has only one pulsed laser source, but includes an intensity
modulator (IM) to block either all the even or all the odd
pulses in mode c. The argumentation here goes exactly
the same like in Sec. VIC and we omit it for simplicity.
The resulting secret key rate in the active scheme is half
the one of the passive setup.
VIII. STATISTICAL FLUCTUATIONS
In this section, we discuss briefly the effect that finite
data size in real life experiments might have on the final
secret key rate. For that, we follow the statistical fluc-
tuation analysis presented in Ref. [12]. This procedure
is based on standard error analysis. That is, we shall
assume that all the variables which are measured in the
experiment each fluctuates around its asymptotic value.
Our main objective here is to obtain a lower bound
on the secret key rate formula given by Eq. (5) under
statistical fluctuations. For that, we realize the following
four assumptions:
1. Alice and Bob know the photon number statistics
of the source well and we do not consider their fluc-
tuations directly. Intuitively speaking, these fluc-
tuations are included in the parameters measuring
the gains and QBERs.
2. Alice and Bob use a real upper bound on the sin-
gle photon error rate e1, thus no fluctuations have
to be considered for this parameter. In particular,
we use the fact that the number of errors within
the single photon states cannot be greater than the
total number of errors.
3. Alice and Bob use a standard error analysis proce-
dure to deal with the fluctuations of the variables
which are measured.
4. The error rate of background does not fluctuate,
i.e., e0 = 1/2.
To illustrate our results, we focus on the passive decoy
state setup introduced in Sec. VI. Note, however, that a
similar analysis can also be applied to the other passive
schemes presented in this paper.
A. Active decoy state QKD
In order to make a fair comparison between the active
and the passive decoy state QKD setups with two inten-
sity settings, from now on we shall consider an active
scheme with only one decoy state [12]. In this last case,
the quantities Y1 and e1 can be bounded as
Y1 ≥ Y L1 =
µ2Qνe
ν − ν2Qµeµ − (µ2 − ν2)Y0
µν(µ− ν) ,
e1 ≤ eU1 =
EµQµe
µ − e0Y0
Y l1µ
, (38)
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where µ (ν) denotes the mean photon number of a signal
(decoy) state, Qµ (Qν) and Eµ (Eν) represent, respec-
tively, its associated gain and QBER, and Y0 is a free pa-
rameter. Using the channel model described in Sec. III,
we find that these parameters can be written as
Qµ = Y0 + 1− e−µηsys ,
EµQµ = e0Y0 + ed(1− e−µηsys),
Qν = Y0 + 1− e−νηsys ,
EνQν = e0Y0 + ed(1− e−νηsys).
(39)
If we now apply a standard error analysis to these quan-
tities we obtain that their deviations from the theoretical
values are given by
∆Qµ = uα
√
Qµ/Nµ,
∆Qν = uα
√
Qν/Nν ,
∆QµEµ = uα
√
2EµQµ/Nµ,
∆QνEν = uα
√
2EνQν/Nν ,
(40)
where Nµ (Nν) denotes the number of signal (weak de-
coy) pulses sent by Alice, and uα represents the number
standard deviations from the central values. That is,
the total number of pulses emitted by the source is just
given by N = Nµ + Nν . Roughly speaking, this means,
for instance, that the gain of the signal states lies in the
interval Qµ ± ∆Qµ except with small probability, and
similarly for the other quantities defined in Eq. (39). For
example, if we select uα = 10, then the corresponding
confidence interval is 1− 1.5× 10−23, which we use later
on for simulation purposes. For simplicity, here we have
assumed that Alice and Bob use the standard BB84 pro-
tocol, i.e., they keep only half of their raw bits (due to
the basis sift). This is the reason for the factor 2 which
appears in the last two expressions of Eq. (40). In this
context, see also Ref. [28] for a discussion on the optimal
value of the parameter q.
B. The background Y0
The bounds given by Eq. (38) depend on the unknown
parameter Y0. When a vacuum decoy state is applied, the
value of Y0 can be estimated. Alternatively, one can also
derive a lower bound on Y1 and an upper bound on e1
which do not depend on Y0. Specifically, from Eqs. (2)-
(3) we obtain that
(1− 2e1)Y1 ≥ A = µ
ν(µ− ν)Qν(1− 2Eν)e
ν
− ν
µ(µ− ν)Qµ(1− 2Eµ)e
µ. (41)
The gains Qµ and Qν , together with the QBERs Eµ and
Eν , are directly measured in the experiment, and their
statistical fluctuations are given by Eq. (40). On the
other hand, we have that
e1 ≤ B
Y L1
, (42)
with the parameter B given by
B = min
{
EνQνe
ν
ν
,
EµQµe
µ − EνQνeν
µ− ν
}
. (43)
Combining Eqs. (41)-(42) we find
Y1[1−H(e1)] ≥ A
1− 2e1
[
1−H
(
B(1− 2e1)
A
)]
. (44)
The quantities A and B can be obtained directly from
the variables measured in the experiment. Moreover, if
one considers the secret key rate formula given by Eq. (5)
as a function of the free parameter e1, then one should
select an upper bound on e1, which gives a value (may
not be a bound) for Y1 as
Y t1 = A+ 2B,
eU1 =
B
A+ 2B
, (45)
where the equation for eU1 comes from solving the two
inequalities given by Eqs. (41)-(42).
Again, using a standard error analysis procedure, we
find that the deviations of the parameters A and B from
their theoretical values can be written as
∆A =
[
(c1∆Qν)
2 + 4(c1∆EνQν)
2 + (c2∆Qµ)
2
+4(c2∆EµQµ)
2
] 1
2
,
∆B = min
{
eµ∆EµQµ
µ
,
eν∆EνQν
ν
,
√
(eµ∆EµQµ)2 + (eν∆EνQν)2
µ− ν
}
, (46)
where the coefficients c1 and c2 have the form
c1 =
µ
ν(µ− ν)e
ν ,
c2 =
ν
µ(µ− ν)e
µ, (47)
and the deviations of the gains and the QBERs are given
by Eq. (40).
For simplicity, we assume now that A and B are sta-
tistically independent. Thus, the statistical deviation of
the crucial term Y1[1−H2(e1)] in the secret key formula
can be written as
∆Y1[1−H2(e1)] =
{[
∆A log2
(
2A+ 2B
A+ 2B
)]2
(48)
+
[
∆B log2
(
4B(A+B)
(A+ 2B)2
)]2} 1
2
.
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FIG. 12: Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by
Eq. (4) in logarithmic scale. We consider four possible sce-
narios: (A) An active decoy state setup (with only one decoy
state) with statistical fluctuations (dashed line) [12], (B) An
active decoy state setup (with only one decoy state) with-
out considering statistical fluctuations (thick solid line) [12],
(C) The passive decoy state scheme with WCP introduced in
Sec. VI now considering statistical fluctuations. In this last
case, moreover, we study two possible situations depending
on the value of ηd: (C1) ηd = 1 (thin solid line), and (C2)
ηd = 0.4 (dash-dotted line). (D) The passive decoy state
scheme with WCP introduced in Sec. VI with ηd = 1 and
without considering statistical fluctuations (dotted line). In
all passive setups the transmittance of the BS is t = 1/2 and
we use ǫ = 0. Furthermore, we pick the data size (total num-
ber of pulses emitted by Alice) to be N = 6 × 109. The
confidence interval for statistical fluctuations is ten standard
deviations (i.e., 1− 1.5× 10−23).
From Eqs. (40), (46) and (48) one can directly calculate
the final secret key rate with statistical fluctuations for
an active decoy state setup with only one decoy state [12].
The result is illustrated in Fig. 12 (dashed line). Here we
use again the experimental data reported by Gobby et
al. in Ref. [25]. Moreover, we pick the data size (total
number of pulses emitted by Alice) to be N = 6 × 109.
We calculate the optimal values of µ and ν for each fiber
length numerically. It turns out that both parameters
are almost constant with the distance. One of them is
weak (it varies between 0.03 and 0.06), while the other
is around 0.48. This figure includes as well the result-
ing secret key rate for the same setup without consider-
ing statistical fluctuations (thick solid line). The cutoff
points where the secret key rate drops down to zero are
l ≈ 129.5 km (active setup with statistical fluctuations)
and l ≈ 147 km (active setup without considering sta-
tistical fluctuations). From these results we see that the
performance of this active scheme is quite robust against
statistical fluctuations.
C. Passive decoy state QKD
The analysis is completely analogous to the previous
section. Specifically, we find that the parameters A and
B are now given by
A =
pc¯2Q
t(1 − 2Et)− pt2Qc¯(1− 2E c¯)
pc¯2p
t
1 − pt2pc¯1
,
B = min
{
E c¯Qc¯
pc¯1
,
pc¯0E
tQt − pt0E c¯Qc¯
pc¯0p
t
1 − pt0pc¯1
}
, (49)
while Eq. (45) is still valid in this scenario. The devia-
tions of A and B have the form
∆A =
1
pc¯2p
t
1 − pt2pc¯1
[
(pc¯2∆Qt)
2 + 4(pc¯2∆EtQt)
2
+(pt2∆Qc¯)
2 + 4(pt2∆Ec¯Qc¯
] 1
2
,
∆B = min
{
∆EtQt
pt1
,
∆Ec¯Qc¯
pc¯1
,
√
(pc¯0∆EtQt)
2 + (pt0∆Ec¯Qc¯)
2
pc¯0p
t
1 − pt0pc¯1
}
. (50)
On the other hand, the deviations of the gains and the
QBERs can now be written as
∆Qt = uα
√
Qt/N,
∆Qc¯ = uα
√
Qc¯/N c¯,
∆EtQt = uα
√
2EtQt/N,
∆Ec¯Qc¯ = uα
√
2E c¯Qc¯/N c¯,
(51)
where N c¯ denotes the number of pulses where Alice ob-
tained no click in her threshold detector, and N is the
total number of pulses emitted by the source. The devia-
tion of the term Y1[1−H2(e1)] is again given by Eq. (48).
The secret key rate for the passive decoy state scheme
with WCP introduced in Sec. VI with two intensity set-
tings and considering statistical fluctuations is illustrated
in Fig. 12. We assume that t = 1/2, i.e., we consider a
simple 50 : 50 BS, and ǫ = 0. The data size is equal to
the one of the previous section, i.e., N = 6 × 109. We
study two different situations depending on the efficiency
of Alice’s threshold detector: ηd = 1 (thin solid line), and
ηd = 0.4 (dash-dotted line). In both cases the optimal
values of the intensities µ1 and µ2 are almost constant
with the distance. One of them is weak (it varies between
0.1 and 0.17), while the other is around 0.5. Figure 12
includes as well the resulting secret key rate for the same
setup with ηd = 1 and without considering statistical
fluctuations (dotted line). The cutoff points where the
secret key rate drops down to zero are l ≈ 53 km (pas-
sive setup with statistical fluctuations and ηd = 0.4),
l ≈ 80 km (passive setup with statistical fluctuations
and ηd = 1), and l ≈ 128 km (passive setup without
considering statistical fluctuations, see Sec. VI). From
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these results we see that the performance of the passive
schemes introduced in Sec. VI (with statistical fluctua-
tions) depends on the actual value of the efficiency ηd.
In particular, when Alice’s detector efficiency is low, the
photon number statistics of the signal states that go to
Bob (conditioned on Alice’s detection) become close to
each other. This effect becomes specially relevant when
one considers statistical fluctuations due to finite data
size. In this last case, small fluctuations can easily cover
the difference between the signal states associated, re-
spectively, to click and no click events on Alice’s thresh-
old detector. As a result, the achievable secret key rate
and distance decrease.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have extended the results presented in
Ref. [18], now showing specifically the analysis for other
practical scenarios with different light sources and photo-
detectors. In particular, we have considered sources
emitting thermal states and phase randomized WCP in
combination with threshold detectors and photon num-
ber resolving (PNR) detectors. In the case of threshold
detectors, we have included as well the effect that de-
tection inefficiencies and dark counts present in current
measurement devices might have on the final secret ket
rate. For simplicity, these measurement imperfections
were not considered in the original proposal. On the
other hand, PNR detectors have allowed us to obtain ul-
timate lower bounds on the maximal performance that
can be expected at all from this kind of passive setups.
We have also presented a passive scheme that employs
strong coherent light and does not require the use of sin-
gle photon detectors, but it can operate with a simpler
classical photo-detector. This fact makes this setup spe-
cially interesting from an experimental point of view. Fi-
nally, we have provided an estimation on the effects that
statistical fluctuations due to a finite data size can have
in practical implementations.
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APPENDIX A: ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
Our starting point is the secret key rate formula given
by Eq. (5). This expression can be lower bounded by
Rl ≥ q{−Qlf(El)H(El) + (pl1Y1 + pl0Y0)
× [1−H(eU1 )]}, (A1)
where eU1 denotes an upper bound on the single photon
error rate e1. Hence, for our purposes it is enough to
obtain a lower bound on the quantities pl1Y1 + p
l
0Y0 for
all l, together with eU1 . For that, we follow the esti-
mation procedure proposed in Ref. [12]. Next, we show
the explicit calculations for the case where Alice uses the
passive scheme introduced in Sec. V.
1. Lower bound on pl1Y1 + p
l
0Y0
The method contains two main steps. First, we have
that pl1Y1 + p
l
0Y0 always satisfies
pl1Y1 + p
l
0Y0 ≥ pl1Y L1 + pl0Y0, (A2)
for all l ∈ {c, c¯}, and where Y L1 denotes a lower bound
on the yield of a single photon state. To find Y L1 , note
that
pt2Q
c¯ − pc¯2Qt =
∞∑
n=0
(pt2p
c¯
n − pc¯2ptn)Yn
≤
1∑
n=0
(pt2p
c¯
n − pc¯2ptn)Yn, (A3)
since
pt2p
c¯
n − pc¯2ptn =
(1− ǫ)(µt)n+2
[(1 + µt)r]3
( 1
rn−2
− 1
(1 + µt)n−2
)
≤ 0, (A4)
for all n ≥ 2, and where the parameter r is given by
Eq. (16). To see this, note that the first term on the r.h.s.
of Eq. (A4) is always greater or equal than zero, and
r ≥ 1 + µt ≥ 1. Similarly, we have that pt2pc¯n − pc¯2ptn ≥ 0
for all n ≤ 1. Combining both results, we obtain
Y1 ≥ Y L1 = max
{
pt2Q
c¯ − pc¯2Qt − (pt2pc¯0 − pc¯2pt0)Y0
pt2p
c¯
1 − pc¯2pt1
, 0
}
.
(A5)
Now comes the second step. The term which multiplies
Y0 in the expression p
l
1Y
L
1 + p
l
0Y0 satisfies
− pl1
pt2p
c¯
0 − pc¯2pt0
pt2p
c¯
1 − pc¯2pt1
+ pl0 ≤ 0. (A6)
This last statement can be proven as follows. The condi-
tion given by Eq. (A6) is equivalent to
pl0(p
t
2p
c¯
1 − pc¯2pt1) ≤ pl1(pt2pc¯0 − pc¯2pt0), (A7)
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since, as we have seen above, pt2p
c¯
1 − pc¯2pt1 ≥ 0. After
a short calculation, it turns out that Eq. (A7) can be
further simplified to
pt1p
c¯
0 − pc¯1pt0 ≥ 0, (A8)
both for l = c and l = c¯. Finally, from the definition of
the probabilities ptn and p
c¯
n given by Eqs. (13)-(15), we
find that
pt1p
c¯
n − pc¯1ptn =
(1− ǫ)(µt)n+1
[(1 + µt)r]2
×
(
1
rn−1
− 1
(1 + µt)n−1
)
, (A9)
which is greater or equal than zero for all n ≤ 1, and
negative otherwise. Note that the first term on the r.h.s.
of Eq. (A9) is always greater or equal than zero, and the
sign of the second term depends on the value of n, since
r ≥ 1 + µt ≥ 1.
We obtain, therefore, that
pl1Y1 + p
l
0Y0 ≥ max
{
pl1(p
t
2Q
c¯ − pc¯2Qt)
pt2p
c¯
1 − pc¯2pt1
(A10)
+
[
pl0 − pl1
pt2p
c¯
0 − pc¯2pt0
pt2p
c¯
1 − pc¯2pt1
]
Y u0 , 0
}
,
for all l ∈ {c, c¯}, and where Y u0 denotes an upper bound
on the background rate Y0. This parameter can be cal-
culated from Eq.(3). In particular, we have that
QcEc =
∞∑
n=0
pcnYnen ≥ pc0Y0e0, (A11)
and similarly for the product Qc¯E c¯. We find
Y0 ≤ Y u0 = min
{
EcQc
pc0e0
,
E c¯Qc¯
pc¯0e0
}
. (A12)
2. Upper bound on e1
For this, we proceed as follows:
pc¯0Q
tEt − pt0Qc¯E c¯ =
∞∑
n=1
(ptnp
c¯
0 − pc¯npt0)Ynen
≥ (pt1pc¯0 − pc¯1pt0)Y1e1, (A13)
where the inequality condition comes from the fact that
ptnp
c¯
0 − pc¯npt0 =
(1− ǫ)(µt)n
(1 + µt)r
(
1
(1 + µt)n
− 1
rn
)
≥ 0,
(A14)
for all n ≥ 1. From Eq. (A13) we obtain, therefore,
that e1 is upper bounded by (p
c¯
0E
tQt−pt0E c¯Qc¯)/[(pt1pc¯0−
pc¯1p
t
0)Y
L
1 ], where Y
L
1 is given by Eq. (A5) with the pa-
rameter Y0 replaced by Y
u
0 .
On the other hand, note that Eq.(3) also provides a
simple upper bound on e1. Specifically,
QcEc =
∞∑
n=0
pcnYnen ≥ pc0Y0e0 + pc1Y1e1, (A15)
and similarly for the product Qc¯E c¯. Putting all these
conditions together, we find that
e1 ≤ eU1 = min
{
EcQc − pc0Y L0 e0
pc1Y
L
1
,
E c¯Qc¯ − pc¯0Y L0 e0
pc¯1Y
L
1
,
pc¯0E
tQt − pt0E c¯Qc¯
(pt1p
c¯
0 − pc¯1pt0)Y L1
}
, (A16)
where Y L0 represents a lower bound on the background
rate Y0. To calculate this parameter we use the following
inequality:
pt1Q
c¯ − pc¯1Qt = (pt1pc¯0 − pc¯1pt0)Y0 +
∞∑
n=2
(pt1p
c¯
n − pc¯1ptn)Yn
≤ (pt1pc¯0 − pc¯1pt0)Y0, (A17)
since, as we have seen above, pt1p
c¯
n − pc¯1ptn ≤ 0 for all
n ≥ 2. From Eq. (A17) we obtain, therefore, that
Y0 ≥ Y L0 = max
{
pt1Q
c¯ − pc¯1Qt
pt1p
c¯
0 − pc¯1pt0
, 0
}
. (A18)
APPENDIX B: PNR DETECTOR
In this Appendix we study the case where Alice uses
a perfect PNR detector to measure the signal states in
mode b. The main goal of this analysis is to obtain an
ultimate lower bound on the secret key rate that can
be achieved at all with the passive decoy state setups
introduced in Sec. V and Sec. VI, in combination with
the security analysis provided in Refs. [8, 20].
A perfect PNR detector can be characterized by a
POVM which contains an infinite number of elements,
Fm = |m〉〈m|, (B1)
with m = 0, 1, . . . ,∞. The outcome of Fm corresponds
to the detection of m photons in mode b.
1. Thermal light
Let us begin by considering the passive scheme ana-
lyzed in Sec. V with Alice using a PNR detector. When-
ever she finds m photons in mode b, then the joint prob-
ability distribution of having n photons in mode a is just
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FIG. 13: Conditional photon number distribution in mode a
when Alice uses a PNR detector, ρ is given by Eq. (11), and
σ is a vacuum state: p0n (black), p
1
n (grey), and p
2
n (white).
We consider that µ = 1, t = 1/2, and n ≤ 5.
given by Eq. (12). Figure 13 shows the conditional pho-
ton number statistics in mode a given that mode b con-
tains exactly m photons: pmn = pn,m/Nm, with
Nm =
∞∑
n=0
pn,m =
1
1 + µ(1− t)
[
µ(1− t)
1 + µ(1 − t)
]m
. (B2)
In this scenario, it turns out that Alice and Bob can
always estimate any finite number of yields Yn and error
rates en with arbitrary precision. In particular, they can
obtain the actual values of the parameters Y0, Y1, and
e1. To see this, let Q
m denote the overall gain of the
signal states sent to Bob when mode b contains exactly
m photons, and let the parametersXm and Vn be defined
as
Xm =
(1 + µ)m+1Qm
[µ(1 − t)]m ,
Vn =
[
µt
1 + µ
]n
Yn. (B3)
With this notation, and using the definition of pn,m given
by Eq. (12), we find that Eq. (2) can be rewritten as
Xm =
∞∑
n=0
(
n+m
m
)
Vn. (B4)
That is, the coefficient matrix of the system of linear
equations given by Eq. (B4) for all possible values of m
is a symmetric Pascal matrix [29]. This matrix has de-
terminant equal to one and, therefore, in principle can
always be inverted [29]. Then, from the knowledge of the
coefficients Vn, the legitimate users can directly obtain
the values of the yields Yn by means of Eq. (B3). A sim-
ilar argument can also be used to show that Alice and
Bob can obtain as well the values of en.
After substituting Eqs. (6)-(9) into the gain and QBER
formulas we obtain
Qm = Nm − (1 − Y0)[µ(1 − t)]
m
{1 + µ[1− (1− ηsys)t]}m+1 ,
QmEm = (e0 − ed)Y0Nm + edQm. (B5)
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FIG. 14: Conditional photon number distribution in mode
a when Alice uses a PNR detector: p0n (black), p
1
n (grey),
and p2n (white). The signal states ρ and σ in Fig. 1 are two
phase randomized WCP given by Eq. (20). We consider that
µ1 = µ2 = 1, t = 1/2, and n ≤ 5.
In order to evaluate Eq. (5) we need to find the proba-
bilities p0,m and p1,m for all m. From Eq. (12) we have
that these parameters can be expressed as
p0,m =
[µ(1 − t)]m
(1 + µ)m+1
,
p1,m =
(m+ 1)t(1− t)m
1 + µ
( µ
1 + µ
)m+1
. (B6)
The resulting lower bound on the secret key rate is
illustrated in Fig. 3 (solid line). The optimal values of the
parameters µ and t are quite constant with the distance.
Specifically, in this figure we choose µ around 18.5 and t
around 0.02.
2. Weak coherent light
Let us now consider the passive scheme illustrated in
Sec. VI with Alice using a PNR detector. Whenever her
detector finds m photons in mode b, the joint probability
distribution of having n photons in mode a is given by
Eq. (21). Figure 14 shows the conditional photon number
statistics in mode a given that mode b contains exactly
m photons: pmn = pn,m/Nm, with
Nm =
∞∑
n=0
pn,m =
υme−υ
m!
1
2π
∫ 2pi
0
(1− γ)meυγdθ. (B7)
To show that the experimental observations associated
to different outcomes of the PNR detector allow Alice and
Bob to obtain the values of the parameters Y0, Y1, and e1
with arbitrary precision, one could follow the same pro-
cedure explained in Appendix B 1. That is, one could try
to prove that the determinant of the coefficient matrices
associated to the systems of linear equations given by
Eqs. (2)-(3) is different from zero also in this scenario.
For simplicity, here we have confirmed this statement
only numerically.
After substituting Eqs. (6)-(9) into the gain and QBER
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formulas we obtain
Qm =
υme−υ
m!
1
2π
∫ 2pi
0
[1− (1− Y0)e−ηsysυγ ]
× (1− γ)meυγdθ,
QmEm = (e0 − ed)Y0Nm + edQm. (B8)
The relevant probabilities p0,m and p1,m can be calcu-
lated directly from Eq. (21). We find that
p0,m =
e−υ(υ − ω)m
Γ1+m
g
[1−m
2
,−m
2
, 1,
ξ2
(υ − ω)2
]
,
p1,m = ωp0,m − e
−υξ2(υ − ω)m−1
2Γm
× g
[1−m
2
, 1− m
2
, 2,
ξ2
(υ − ω)2
]
, (B9)
where the Gamma function Γz is defined as [26]
Γz =
∫ ∞
0
tz−1e−tdt, (B10)
and where g(a, b, c, z) represents the hypergeometric
function [26]. This function is defined as [26]
g(a, b, c, z) =
Γc
ΓbΓc−b
∫ 1
0
tb−1(1 − t)c−b−1
(1− tz)a dt. (B11)
In this case, the lower bound on the resulting secret
key rate reproduces approximately the behavior of the
asymptotic active decoy state setup illustrated in Fig. 5
(solid line). Here we have assumed again that t = 1/2.
The values of the intensities µ1 and µ2 which optimize
the secret key rate formula are, respectively, ≈ 10−4 and
≈ 0.95. As already discussed in Sec. VI, this result is
not surprising since the only difference between both se-
tups (passive and active) arises from the photon number
probabilities of the signal states sent by Alice. While in
the passive scheme the relevant statistics are given by
Eq. (B9), in the active setup they have the form
p0,m = e
−µm ,
p1,m = e
−µmµm, (B12)
with µm denoting the mean photon number of the signals
associated to setting m. Still, it turns out that this dif-
ference is not significant enough to be appreciated with
the resolution of Fig. 5 when we optimize the parameters
µ1 and µ2.
APPENDIX C: WEAK COHERENT LIGHT:
PROBABILITIES ptn AND p
c¯
n
In this Appendix we provide explicit expressions for
the probabilities ptn and p
c¯
n, with n = 0, 1, 2, for the case
of a passive decoy state setup with phase randomized
WCP. After a short calculation, we find that
pt0 = I0,ξe
−ω,
pt1 = (ωI0,ξ − ξI1,ξ)e−ω,
pt2 =
1
2
[
ω2I0,ξ + (1− 2ω)ξI1,ξ + ξ2I2,ξ
]
e−ω, (C1)
with ω = µ1t+ µ2(1 − t). The probabilities pc¯n have the
form
pc¯0 = τI0,(1−ηd)ξ,
pc¯1 = τ(ωI0,(1−ηd)ξ − ξI1,(1−ηd)ξ),
pc¯2 =
τ
2
{
ω2I0,(1−ηd)ξ +
[ 1
1− ηd − 2ω
]
ξI1,(1−ηd)ξ
+ ξ2I2,(1−ηd)ξ
}
, (C2)
where τ = (1− ǫ)e−[ηdυ+(1−ηd)ω].
APPENDIX D: PROBABILITIES p<IMn AND p
>IM
n
In this Appendix we provide explicit expressions for
the probabilities p<IMn and p
>IM
n , with n = 0, 1, 2. For
simplicity, we impose I1 = I2 = IM ≡ I. After a short
calculation, we obtain
p<IM0 =
e−κ
2
(I0,ζ − L0,ζ), (D1)
p<IM1 =
e−κ
2
[κ(I0,ζ − L0,ζ)− ζ(I1,ζ − L−1,ζ)],
p<IM2 =
e−κ
4
{
κ2(I0,ζ − L0,ζ) + ζ
[ 2
π
(
1− ζ
2
3
)
+ (1− 2κ)(I1,ζ − L−1,ζ) + ζ(I2,ζ − L2,ζ)
]}
,
where κ = It2, ζ = 2κ
√
t1r1, and Lq,z represents the
modified Struve function [27]. This function is defined as
[27]
Lq,z =
zq
2q−1
√
πΓq+1/2
∫ pi/2
0
sinh (z cos θ) sin θ2qdθ.
(D2)
On the other hand, the probabilities p>IMn have the form
p>IM0 =
e−κ
2
(I0,ζ + L0,ζ), (D3)
p>IM1 =
e−κ
2
[κ(I0,ζ + L0,ζ)− ζ(I1,ζ + L−1,ζ)],
p>IM2 =
e−κ
4
{
κ2(I0,ζ + L0,ζ) + ζ
[
− 2
π
(
1− ζ
2
3
)
+ (1− 2κ)(I1,ζ + L−1,ζ) + ζ(I2,ζ + L2,ζ)
]}
.
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